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essential for the stability of the financial system. In the absence of conflicts of interest and the importance of the 
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at the expense of the quality of ratings. The demonstrated failures of the rating agencies confirm the need for strict 
regulations to restore investor confidence in the ratings. 
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Introduction 
The regulation of credit rating agencies has been subject of extensive discussion and change 
in recent years. The global financial crisis has exposed the significant failures of rating agencies and 
their systematic importance for the stability of the financial sector. The inability of self-regulation 
to provide high-quality ratings with valuable information content requires an explanation of the 
problems and identification of measures to solve them. The main way to improve ratings is 
mandatory and strict regulation which reduce conflicts of interest, promote competition and 
increase the responsibility of rating agencies. 
 
1. Reputational capital and self-regulation 
The financial regulation, including rating agencies, depends on the extent to which 
participants can function effectively without external interference or severity of market failures that 
require adoption and application of specific rules. For a long time, credit rating agencies had been 
running their business without formal rules, self-regulating. The main argument for self-regulation 
is the view of agencies as gatekeepers and the concept of reputational capital. The fundamental 
function of rating agencies is to provide information. Ratings can overcome the information 
asymmetry between creditor and debtor by involving a third party to certify the debtor's 
creditworthiness. From this perspective, the credit rating agency is a gatekeeper of debt securities 
markets, which verify information about the issuer’s financial condition and certify its 
creditworthiness by assigning a credit rating (Coffee, 2004; Partnoy, 2006). 
The need for rating agencies is determined by the information asymmetry between the issuer 
and the investor in a debt instrument. If the seller has complete information about the product he is 
selling and the buyer is not able to assess the quality of the product, the “lemon” problem arises 
(Akerloff, 1970). The situation is similar in the bond market, where issuers (sellers) have an 
information advantage over investors (buyers). This information asymmetry will cause 
inefficiencies and even market collapse. Information asymmetry can be resolved if sellers can send 
a credible signal to buyers about the actual quality of the product (Spence, 1973). Buyers will trust 
the signal if the losses from sending a false signal outweigh the benefits. In debt securities markets, 
the credit rating act as a signal. When a rating agency assigns a rating, it gives a signal to investors 
about the creditworthiness of issuers. This signal enables them to differentiate the securities 
according to their quality and to determine adequate market prices. To play its role the rating must 
be a credible signal. If an agency systematically has true estimates of issuers’ credit risk over time, 
it builds a reputation among investors. The reputation building requires additional costs for high 
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quality analysis, but rating agency receives higher fees due to the higher reputation among 
investors. The credit rating will be a reliable signal, because if the rating agency assigns a false 
rating, its gains will be much smaller than the losses. In short run the agency would receive 
additional fees form incorrect high ratings because it will attract more issuers. In the long run, 
however, the agency will suffer much greater losses due to damaged reputation and related rents 
(Dittrich, 2007, 21). 
The idea of reputational capital has a long history1 and has been applied to debt markets and 
credit rating agencies (Diamond, 1989; Mann, 1999; Partnoy, 1999; Brookfield and Ormrod, 2000; 
Schwarcz, 2002; Smith and Walter 2002). Until the beginning of the 21st century, the view that 
rating agencies certify creditworthiness based on their established reputation is widespread and 
accepted in theory and practice (Partnoy, 2002, 67-68). Any specific regulation is not needed, 
because the problems are solved by market forces. If a rating agency assigns incorrect ratings, it 
will lose its reputation and customers. New players, who offer better ratings, will enter the market. 
The three major credit rating agencies (Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch), which have been successful for 
decades, are cited as evidence of the reputational capital they have acquired and an argument 
against strict regulation. 
If the established reputation is important, the rating agencies themselves have an interest in 
improving their activities and no external supervision by a state regulator is needed. In this case, 
self-regulation is more appropriate. Self-regulating rating agencies set their own rules or adhere to 
generally accepted ones without being coerced. In self-regulation, there are no penalties for 
breaking the rules. The control is only by internal procedures or by criticism from market 
participants. In this regard, in case of deviation from the rules, the agencies must publicly explain 
the reasons for this (“comply or explain” principle). 
For a significant period of time (actually until the global financial crisis), the activities of 
rating agencies had been largely subject to self-regulation, and this was considered to be sufficient 
(Gillen, 2008). Each rating agency had adopted its own internal rules that govern its rating process. 
Aiming more efficiency and unification in 2003 International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) published Principles Regarding the Activities of Credit Rating Agencies 
(IOSCO, 2003). The principles referred four areas: quality and integrity in the rating process; 
independence and conflicts of interest; transparency and timeliness of ratings disclosure and 
confidential information. The four main principles are: 1) Credit  Rating  Agencies should endeavor 
to issue opinions that help reduce the asymmetry of information among borrowers, lenders and 
other market participants.; 2) Credit  Rating  Agency ratings decisions should be independent and 
free from political or economic pressures and from conflicts of interest arising due to the Credit  
Rating  Agency’s ownership structure, business or financial activities, or the financial interests of 
the Credit  Rating  Agency’s employees.  Credit  Rating  Agencies should, as far as possible, avoid 
activities, procedures or relationships that may compromise or appear to compromise the 
independence and objectivity of the credit rating operations.; 3) Credit  Rating  Agencies should 
make disclosure and transparency an objective in their ratings activities.; 4) Credit Rating  Agencies 
should maintain in confidence all non-public information communicated to them by any issuer, or 
its agents, under the terms of a confidentiality agreement or otherwise under a mutual understanding 
that the information is shared confidentially. 
To specify the Principles in 2004 IOSCO published Code of Conduct Fundamentals for 
Credit Rating Agencies, amended in 2008 and 2015 г. (IOSCO, 2004; IOSCO, 2008, IOSCO, 
2015). All three leading rating agencies (Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch) have implemented IOSCO 
Principles and Code in their own internal rules (Fitch Ratings, 2017; S&P Global Ratings, 2018; 
Moody’s Investors Service, 2020). However, all three agencies exclude liability for damages for 
 
1 The value of reputation in economic relationships was discussed by Adam Smith (Smith, 1766, 253-254). More 
complete model of the reputation mechanism was developed by Shapiro (1983) for product markets. 
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violating their code of conducts. Deviations from the IOSCO Principles and Code are only 
explained, but the agencies are not penalized for such deviations. 
 
2. Regulatory license, conflicts of interest, and need of strict regulation 
For decades, the reputation model had been applied to rating agencies. Ratings had been 
considered to have positive value for the markets and significant changes had not been needed (Hill, 
2004). The events in end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century, however, questioned this 
view. In a number of cases of financial trouble and bankruptcy (Penn Central bankruptcy in 1970, 
New York City fiscal crisis in 1976, Orange County default in 1994, Asian financial crisis in 1997, 
collapse of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998, Enron and World-Com bankruptcies 
in 2001) agencies assigned too high (investment) ratings, lowering them shortly (and too late) 
before defaults and thus not responding in time to the increased credit risk (Moosa, 2017). With the 
beginning of the subprime crisis in 2007, led to the global financial crisis of 2008, the failure of 
rating agencies to provide accurate and timely assessments, especially with regard to structured 
finance products, finally became clear. The ratings assigned to a significant number of instruments 
were too high and inflated, changing slowly as market conditions change (White, 2013). There is a 
consensus that rating agencies are one of the factors that have contributed to increasing systemic 
risk and deepening the crisis (Moosa, 2017; Partnoy, 2017). Large rating agencies were fined with 
significant amount of money2 and acknowledged that they had lowered their standards and 
intentionally inflated their ratings (Joffe, 2018). 
The issues with quality and reputation of rating agencies can be explained by changes in 
their business model and regulations. Initially, the agencies received fees from bond investors. In 
the investor-pays business model, agencies assess the creditworthiness of issuers and sell this 
information to investors. Thus, rating agencies have an interest in maximum accuracy of ratings, 
because otherwise investors will not pay for their services. In the late 1960s and early 1970s 
agencies adopted issuer-pays model3, which is used in the present. Under this model, rating 
agencies receive their revenues from issuers and become dependent on them. The agencies have an 
incentive to overrate the creditworthiness of the debtors and to determine a rating higher than the 
actual one because by doing so they will attract more clients and will not lose present ones who 
would go to another agency. This is in conflict with investors’ interests requiring adequate 
assessments of the issuer’s credit risk. Dependence on issuers is also increasing by the additional 
services (e.g. consulting) that rating agencies provide when issuing debt securities. 
Changes in financial regulations are also essential. After the 1930s in the United States was 
introduced the restriction that various financial institutions (first banks and then insurance 
companies, pension funds) could buy and hold only investment grade securities and investment in 
speculative securities was prohibited. Determination of investment and speculative grade is based 
on “recognized rating manuals” e.g. credit ratings (White, 2013). In 1975 the regulatory use of 
ratings deepened with the use of credit ratings in determining the capital requirements for securities 
firms. The important change was that only ratings assigned by a nationally recognized statistical 
rating organization (NRSRO) can be used for regulatory purposes. The three major rating agencies 
were certified for NRSRO, thus gave them the status of quasi-regulatory bodies. In the following 
years, the regulatory use of only NRSRO ratings was also introduced for banks, investment 
companies and other financial institutions (Partnoy, 2002, 72-78). With the development of 
 
2 In settlement agreement with The Department of Justice and several states S&P paid $1.375 billion penalty and 
admitted that the company declined to downgrade underperforming assets because it was worried that doing so would 
hurt the company’s business (US Department of Justice, 2015). In similar agreement Moody’s paid nearly $864 million 
and admitted that company used a more lenient standard for Aaa structured instruments and did not issue publications 
about this practice to the general market (US Department of Justice, 2017). 
3 In 1968 S&P adopted issuer-pay model for all municipal bonds. In 1970 Moody’s began charging issuers for both 
corporate and municipal bond ratings. In 1974 S&P began charging corporate bond issuers too (Jiang, Stanford, and 
Xie, 2012). 
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financial markets, the regulatory status of ratings extends to other countries. In the EU, ratings are 
used in a number of financial regulations (Blaurock, 2007). They are often used in a number of 
other countries (BIS, 2000). With the implementation of the Basel II Accord (International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework) after 2004 
(BIS, 2004), the regulatory license of ratings became global. Ratings are used by regulators to 
restrict investment and set capital requirements for financial institutions. Rating agencies became 
private institutions with regulatory status and their services are mandatory for investors and issuers. 
Thus, ratings must be used regardless of their quality and there is no market mechanism to remove 
agencies with incorrect credit risk assessments of issuers. 
The regulatory license and the issuer-pays model are the reasons for the failure of the 
reputation view. A third party to send a reliable signal and certify the quality of an asset, three 
conditions must be met (Megginson and Weiss, 1991). First, the certifying agent must have 
reputational capital at stake, that can be lost in wrong certification. Second, the value of the agent's 
reputational capital must be greater than the largest possible gain from false certification. Third, it 
must be costly for the issuing firm to purchase the services of the certifying agent, and the cost must 
be increasing with the increase of information asymmetry. These condition can be applied to 
reputational capital model of credit rating agencies. Rating agencies have reputational capital that 
they can lose by assigning wrong ratings. Reputational capital losses may be greater than the 
additional fees rating agencies could receive from a false rating. Ratings are costly, and the cost 
could be higher if they have more information content. But the three conditions are not satisfied by 
rating agencies (Partnoy, 1999). First, rating agencies have little reputational capital at stake. Due 
their regulatory status, investors have no choice but to trust them. In addition, agencies can easily 
achieve minimum reliability of ratings by following the changes in the prices of the debt 
instruments they assess. Second, the gain from inaccurate ratings vastly exceeds the cost of any loss 
in reputational capital. Due to the issuer-pays model, rating agencies can receive significantly 
higher fees if they set higher ratings. This is especially true for structured finance products - the 
history of the global financial crisis has shown that by assigning inflated ratings rating agencies 
made huge profits without worrying about losing their reputation. In addition, the agencies’ 
assessments are treated as opinions and they do not bear legal liability. Third, the agencies’ services 
are not costly to copy. Rating movements just follow the debt markets and ratings are easy to be 
predicted after the market events. Because reputational capital can not provide reliability of credit 
ratings self-regulation does not work. 
Another argument against self-regulation is the protection of investors' rights. The ratings 
affect their interests for two reasons. First, rating fees are part of the issuance costs and thus 
increase the issue price paid by investors. Second, due to the regulatory use of ratings, investors are 
required to reckon with them in their investment decisions. In the absence of regulation, investors 
can not sue rating agencies because they do not enter into a contract with them and do not have a 
direct relationship. In this regard, formal rules are needed to make agencies accountable to 
investors. 
The need for statutory regulations is also determined by the deterrence effect (Hemraj, 2015, 
22-24). If rating agencies self-regulate, they will not face sanctions for violating the rules. If the 
reputation is irrelevant, they will continue to harm the interests of investors. Statutory regulation 
includes penalties for violations that have a deterrent effect on the behavior of rating agencies, 
harmful for the interests of investors and other stakeholders. 
The described arguments substantiate the need for strict regulation of the activity of rating 
agencies. Regulations should be mandatory and enforced by a state regulator, which would impose 
sanctions for violation of the rules. 
 
3. Current state and perspectives for regulation 
The need for strict regulation of rating agencies has been undoubtedly confirmed by the 
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global financial crisis. As a result, in most countries mandatory rules have been introduced4 in the 
following areas: 
• Increasing competition. Clear rules for the registration of rating agencies are introduced, 
which apply equally to all. Agencies are prohibited from forcing issuers to use their services by 
lowering ratings or selectively changing the methodologies for determining them. Unsolicited 
ratings are regulated and must be clearly marked and distinguished from the others. In structured 
instruments, rating agencies are required to provide access to all information available and used to 
determine the rating of that instrument to any other registered agency that requires access to such 
information. In addition, in the EU, agencies must make publicly available all information on the 
loss and cash flow analysis on the basis of which structured instruments are valued. In order to 
stimulate competition and increase accuracy, EU regulations require a structured finance rating to 
be assigned by at least two agencies. European rules also require issuers to consider hiring a smaller 
rating agency (with less than 10% market share) in cases where two or more rating agencies are 
hired. If such a smaller agency is not hired, this must be documented. 
• Reducing conflicts of interest. As a general principle, rating agencies must identify any 
conflicts of interest that may lead to the inadequate ratings and organize their activities in a way to 
avoid such conflicts. In particular, persons who are related to or receive remuneration from the 
issuer or another party with an interest in it shall be prohibited from assigning the rating. In 
addition, the remuneration of the persons assigning the ratings can not depend on the revenues that 
the agencies receive from the rated companies. Credit specialists have to be rotated so that an expert 
does not participate in determining the rating of the same issuer for an extended period of time. 
Rating agencies are prohibited from providing additional advisory services that directly affect the 
credit rating, including the design of structured finance products. The agencies are obliged to 
appoint a compliance officer to monitor compliance with all regulatory requirements, as well as to 
maintain a review function that monitors the adequacy of the applied methodologies. The activity 
and remuneration of the compliance officer and the rating monitoring service must be independent 
of the rating activity. 
• Ensuring transparency of credit rating agencies. In this regard, regulations require agencies 
to disclose detailed information on: legal structure and ownership; large customers; revenues from 
rating assessment; revenues from additional services; potential conflicts of interest and the system 
for avoiding them; assigned ratings; rating methodology, quantitative models and the assumptions 
in them; the percentage of defaults by individual rating categories, as well as other data needed to 
assess the rating accuracy; the results of compliance assessment with the regulations, etc. Agencies 
should provide public access to information on the history of their ratings, which should be in 
structured and machine readable format5. 
• Liability of rating agencies. In the event of a legal requirements violation, regulators have 
the power to hold agencies accountable, including by imposing various penalties – fines, periodic 
financial sanctions, temporary ban on the issuance of credit ratings, suspension of the use of ratings 
for regulatory purposes, termination of the registration of the agency. The affected persons can seek 
in court compensation for damages caused by the activities of rating agencies, but it is not absolute. 
In the US, private claims can be dismissed on the basis of protection of freedom of speech, while in 
the EU investors and issuers can seek damages, but only to the extent that relevant national law 
allows. 
 
4 In the USA the regulations were introduced with Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 and Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act from 2010. In the EU was adopted Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on credit rating agencies. Similar regulations were 
adopted in many other countries (Kruck, 2011; Darbellay, 2013). 
5 In the USA rating agencies must provide on their internet sites information on ratings for the (history of ratings) in 
XBRL (eXtensible Business Reporting Language) format with standard taxonomy. In the EU European Rating Platform 
provides public access to information on rating agencies and historical data of their ratings. 
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• Limiting the regulatory use of ratings. In this respect, US and EU approaches differ. In the 
United States, a more radical approach is used by removing regulations based on ratings, including 
those of banks, investment companies and other financial institutions. All federal agencies must 
remove any reference to credit ratings. However, this requirement does not apply to the supervision 
of defined benefit pension funds, as well as insurance companies, which are regulated at the state 
level. In the EU, financial institutions are required to have their own credit risk assessment of 
issuers or financial instruments, which can not be based solely on a rating. However, this allows 
ratings to be used in combination with other indicators in credit assessments, which partially 
preserves their regulatory status. 
The credit rating agencies regulations introduced in the last decade have had a positive 
impact, but there are still some unresolved issues in this field. The oligopolistic situation in the 
credit rating market has not changed, with the three large agencies still having over 90% market 
share. Although there has been an improvement in compliance with the rules, rating agencies still 
infringe regulations of transparency, compliance with adopted policies, procedures and 
methodologies, prevention of conflicts of interest, quality of internal control mechanisms in 
assigning ratings, corporate management, etc. (SEC, 2020). The disclosed methodologies applied in 
determining credit ratings are not transparent enough, contain many subjective elements and can not 
be re-applied by an outside person. Rating agencies still react slowly, usually reviewing ratings 
once every few months. The informational content of the ratings can be increased – in addition to 
the rating as a combination of letters, which reflect relative probability of default, the rating agency 
can provide an assessment of absolute probability of default, loss given default and recovery rate. 
To overcome the described issues, the following changes in the regulations of rating 
agencies can be recommended: 
• Complete removal of the regulatory status of ratings. This requires changing the whole set 
of regulations of the financial system, removing any reference to ratings in determining capital 
requirements, restrictions on investment policy, liquidity management and other regulated aspects 
of the activities of all financial institutions. The financial institutions should implement their own 
credit risk assessment methodologies that are subject to supervision for accuracy. Removing the 
regulatory use of ratings requires not only changes in rules, but also an increased organizational, 
human and financial capacity of financial regulators in order to adequately evaluate the accuracy of 
the credit risk assessment systems used by supervised institutions. In this regard, a good example is 
banking regulation, where the development, implementation and supervision of internal credit risk 
management systems without reference to outside ratings is widespread (White, 2016). In addition 
to changes in financial regulations, governments and other public organizations should not 
mechanically use ratings to determine their investment policy and cost management. They may 
independently perform own credit risk analyzes or outsource them on a competitive basis to 
external credit analysts, including rating agencies. 
Removing regulatory requirements based on credit ratings will put strong pressure on rating 
agencies to improve accuracy and information content of their rating systems, because they are 
going to lose their market power and will have to compete with all entities that specialize in 
analysis of credit information. If this is achieved, the strict regulations of the rating business can be 
removed, including elimination of registration and licensing. Ratings will be treated as investment 
advice and agencies will only have to comply with requirements for liability and protection of 
clients' interests. The lower barriers of entry for new players, reduced cost of enforcing regulations, 
increased competition and innovation will further improve the volume and quality of information in 
credit markets. 
However, until the complete removal of the regulatory use of ratings, the current regulations 
must be enhanced in the following directions: 
• Global harmonization of regulations. Although many of the rules regulating rating agencies 
are similar in the US, the EU and other financial markets, there are still differences that allow rating 
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agencies to benefit from the most “liberal” regime in different countries. The global nature of the 
big agencies requires a global approach in regulation. International convergence is facilitated by 
common regulatory problems and goals in different countries. The International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) is an appropriate platform for reaching global agreement about 
rating standards (Campos, 2004). 
• Regulation of rating agencies by an independent and autonomous regulatory authority. 
Rating agencies’ functions are similar to those of registered auditors and their supervision should be 
carried out in a similar way – by a separate and independent body. At present, supervision is in the 
competence of the regulators of the securities markets. This facilitates close and intensive relations 
between regulator and issuers, investors and rating agencies, which make supervisors dependent on 
the supervised (Partnoy, 2017). From this point of view, a separate supervisory authority is more 
appropriate. 
• Stimulating competition and mitigating conflicts of interest. In this regard, appropriate 
measures are: 
- facilitating access to information for credit risk analysis. The assessment of the probability 
of default is based on data from financial statements of the issuers and market value of their 
securities. At the moment, part of the information is public, as it is disclosed through the 
commercial registers and the registers of financial regulators. The main impediment to analysis is 
the unstructured form of this information, which is difficult and expensive to collect and process. 
To facilitate access, requirements about information disclosure should be introduced. The issuers 
have to publish all data in a structured form that is easy to machine processing (Joffe, 2018). The 
most appropriate is the XBRL format with standardized structure. In addition to companies, central 
and local governments, and other public organizations that issue debt securities must publish data in 
a structured form. 
If the issuers are not public companies and are assigned a rating, they should be required to 
disclose the same information as public companies. Disclosure of information should also apply to 
structured finance instruments, including the characteristics of the assets to be securitized. A 
disclosure requirement should also be introduced for local authorities and public organizations to 
which a credit rating is assigned (White, 2016). 
Having detailed, publicly accessible and computer readable information on issuers and 
securities will greatly facilitate credit analysis and enable smaller agencies and independent analysts 
to provide credit evaluations that are alternative to ratings. Greater public awareness will make 
rating agencies more responsible. They will not follow demand of issuers for higher ratings, 
because such behavior will be easily noticed. 
- accepting alternative assessments for regulatory use. Competition in credit risk analysis 
may increase if, in addition to the ratings of registered agencies, the opinions of independent 
analysts are recognized for regulatory purposes (Joffe, 2018). Regulators may accept the analyses 
made by academic researchers, research centers, universities and non-profit organizations that have 
credit market expertise. If their methodologies are well documented, publicly disclosed and 
approved by regulators, they can be used as an alternative to credit ratings. 
- rotation of rating agencies. Similar to auditors, when an issuer uses the services of a rating 
agency, after а certain period the issuer must change the agency (Jeon and Lovo, 2013). This will 
promote competition and limit the agency’s commitment with issuers and the resulting conflict of 
interest. 
- fee regardless of the rating. If issuers pay fees to rating agencies before the rating is 
assigned or before the selection of rating agencies, it will reduce the incentive to set inflated ratings 
(New York State Attorney General, 2008). 
- disclosure of fees payed by issuers to rating agencies for ratings and other consulting 
services. There is a similar requirement for audit services, and the disclosure of such information 
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will show investors the degree of dependence of agencies on issuers and will provide an indication 
of a conflict of interest (Jiang, Stanford, and Xie, 2012). 
• Greater transparency of rating agencies. In this regard, rating agencies should publish a 
detailed description of the quantitative methods they use so that they can be applied and verified by 
outsiders. This will significantly facilitate external control over their activities. In addition, when an 
infringement is found, the regulator has to disclose the agency committed the infringement and 
what exactly it is. Currently, regulators only report identified violations and do not disclose names 
of agencies. 
• Increased liability of rating agencies. The regulations must allow all persons concerned to 
claim in courts compensations for damages from the rating agency infringed the rules. It must be 
clearly defined in which cases the compensation is due and the possibility of excluding liability 
must be removed, including on the basis of arguments such as the protection of freedom of speech 
or gaps and exceptions in civil law. 
 
Conclusion 
Credit rating agencies are important participants in debt markets that reduce information 
asymmetry about credit risk. As gatekeepers, they can send a credible signal to investors about the 
issuer’s creditworthiness. If rating agencies have trust and accumulated reputational capital, no 
mandatory regulations are needed and they can self-regulate. However, the global financial crisis 
has shown that the model of reputational capital and self-regulation does not work. The main 
reasons are the transition to issuer-pays business model and the widespread use of ratings for 
regulatory purposes. These developments create significant conflicts of interest with investors and 
minimize the importance of reputation for agencies. This justifies the need for strict regulation of 
rating agencies, which was introduced in the last decade. Regulations have introduced rules to 
reduce conflicts of interest and increase transparency and liability of rating agencies. 
Despite significant progress, further improvement of regulations towards the complete 
removal of regulatory status of ratings, global harmonization of regulations, and greater 
competition, transparency and liability of rating agencies can be recommended. 
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